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Introduction
What determines the level and allocation of donor government funding in population assistance programs? And why do disbursements generally lag behind the good intentions?
These questions are the focus of attention of policy makers and advisors within government, NGOs and multilateral agencies in both developing and developed world. The intentions of 179 international governments who were involved in the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in the summer 1994 were quite clear and leave almost no room for what should determine funding efforts. "All countries should take steps to meet the family planning needs of their populations as soon as possible and should, in all cases by the year 2015, seek to provide universal access to a full range of safe and reliable family planning methods and to related reproductive health services which are not against the law."
(par. 7.16) The donor governments promised to finance one third of the total amount of resource flows that are tied to population activities in developing countries. At that moment in time the Programme of Action was lauded with praise and entitled as "a turning point in humanity" and "a quantum leap to a higher state of energy." Today we are halfway through the 20-year Programme of Action and commentators, policy makers and advocates are worried by the fact that actual disbursements of funds are lagging behind promises and the unbalanced attention for specific population issues within the ICPD agenda. Specifically the dominance of the HIV/AIDS programs and the neglect of family planning and reproductive health care in spelling out Millennium Development Goals (MDG) has worried many within the family planning movement (cf. Cleland and Sinding, 2005) . As Sinding stated: "If you're not an MDG, you're not on the agenda. If you're not a line item, you're out of the game."
(cited in Crossette, 2005: 77) The divergence between promises and actions has been around ever since the Programme of Action was formalized and translated into financial statements. The main contribution of this paper is to offer an empirical examination of the driving forces and preferences behind the funds provided and the allocation of funds by donors, as envisioned in the ICPD Programme of Action. In that respect it complements the discussion by Blanc and Tsui (2005) and Crossette (2005) who offered a view how insiders appraise the faltering status of family planning movement and the dominance of the HIV/AIDS camp.
According to insiders the changing positions has in part been helped by the way the Millenium Development Goals were formalized. Within this light it is of considerable importance to see whether the numbers tell a different story. The central question -what drives donor funding? -is evaluated by two dimensions: (1) the level of donor contributions and its allocation over the various reproductive health categories; and (2) the sharing of burdens within population and AIDS programs. Before we do so, we will first explain in brief why funding by donors fluctuates or why in principle promises in global collective action are rarely attained (cf. Bulir and Hamann, 2003) .
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Understanding donor behavior
Understanding donor behavior starts with the fact that foreign aid is just like any other line item in the government budget prone to the influences of politics and the economy. Donating money is a public choice and by their very human nature donors, to cite Mayhew (2002: 220) , "are not neutral, philanthropic givers of gifts. Donors are subject to the national and international political interests that can influence their decisions on program and service support to the detriment of local needs." In general one can think of four reasons why the level of foreign population assistance is lagging behind the grand ambitions of Cairo: (1) a lack in willingness to pay; (2) a lack in ability to pay; (3) the appearance of 'free rider' behavior in financing global public goods; and (4) political opportunism.
The first argument is straightforward: the provision of funds is simply a matter of 'taste': a taste for caring about others, or a preference for certain programs which are in line with one's religious beliefs or Weltanschauung. In this respect, one can expect some donor countries to be more sensitive towards the fate of people living in the less developed world than other donors as some (population) programs are more in line with their preferences.
Furthermore, governments of European countries are known to be more egalitarian in their national economic policies and these egalitarian preferences may perhaps carry over towards income differences in the world at large. But differences in taste may also be reflected in The third argument -the presence of free rider behavior (Sandler, 2004) -is the most difficult behavioral element to assess, but this type of behavior may very well be an element that hampers the generation of donor funds in the context of the Cairo conference. When collective action is necessary to achieve an outcome (e.g., reduce poverty) which benefits all countries in the world with an interest in the recipient's well-being, it is in the interest of the individual country to contribute to the provision of the collective good like a global aid program or institution. It is enlightened self interest to participate in and pay for collective action. The seminal contribution of Mancur Olson in his The Logic of Collective Action (1965) was to show that rational individuals may make choices leaving the collective in an inferior position. Individual rationality is not sufficient to provide a collective rational choice and this statement was in marked contrast with the received view that markets do not fail and individual decisions always promote the common good. Free riders destroy this ideal world.
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To be more specific, free riders are those individuals who benefit from collective action but who do not contribute or who do not contribute sufficiently and for the collective this may imply that goods are not provided or in insufficient amounts. Population assistance programs pose a collective action problem for the international community not unlike many other foreign aid programs. Many developing nations must rely on other nations to provide them with resources and cash to finance population activities, like family planning, investments in reproductive health, AIDS programs and basic research. By increasing the welfare of a recipient country, foreign aid serves as a collective global good for all donor countries. For instance, if the US helps India and the UK is also interested in the well being of India the UK government can free ride on the foreign aid efforts of the US government. This mechanism is akin to a host of collective action failures in foreign aid and may well explain why promises are rarely met. Detecting free rider behavior is, however, far more difficult than stating the problem of free riders.
The economists Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) were the first to empirically examine free rider behavior within international alliances. They focused in their pioneering study mainly on the financing of military strategic alliances, such as the NATO. Their theory can however be applied to other issues which share the problem of alliances in financing a public good, and foreign aid is one of them. Essentially their 'exploitation thesis' boils down to the following point: the welfare of the recipient depends on the sum of aid received from others and the recipient does not really care where the money is coming from. Suppose, furthermore, that the recipient's welfare affects the welfare of the would-be donors in a positive manner, then donor contributions will be positively related to the donor's income. Wealthier nations would have a greater desire to contribute aid and so wealthier nations will also bear a larger share of the burden than less well-off nations. In other words, small countries will exploit the benevolence of large countries. The provision of foreign aid would then be less than optimal 7 and some supranational action should be initiated to correct this failure. This type of behavior may very well be an element that distorts the generation of donor funds in the context of the Cairo conference. The question is therefore whether some governments of small countries are 'free riding' on the contributions of large countries like the US and Japan? Or is it simply the other way around?
Besides the dynamics of collective action, there may also be traces of political opportunism -the fourth factor -in explaining donor behavior. Governments pledged to live up to the Cairo agenda but living up to this ideal involves resources, which could also be spent on internal more visible issues offering more value for money in the eyes of the voter.
This type of behavior is aptly described by public choice models in which politicians serve the needs of the voter or who try to signal to voters by their policy actions that they are worth voting for. If this applies to the case of foreign aid then it is the interests of the voters in the donor countries that are served and not the interests of those living in less developed countries. The business of foreign aid may perhaps be paved with good intentions, in practice one cannot deny the role which colonial ties, favorable trade positions, governance structures, religious beliefs, geography and human rights can play in bringing about and sustaining aid flows (Schraeder, Taylor and Hook, 1998; Alesina and Dollar, 2001; Chauvet, 2002; Neumayer, 2003) . It would be very surprising to see that population assistance would not be susceptible to such self-interested motives. In short, the question we are trying to answer is whether donor behavior is a matter of opportunism?
The inherent difficulty with the above stated elements that affect donor funding is that each and every element is difficult to disentangle from aggregate spending figures. We are well aware of the pitfalls of using aggregate data. At best, the patterns revealed in the donor funding data suggest that some mechanism or rule of thumb is at work that prevents the international community from attaining goals set at population conferences, or the patterns 8 might destroy myths or anecdotes which persist in sketching a picture of the international community of donor governments.
Donor Funding Statistics
In Bulatao, 1998) .
Level of Disbursements
To start with the level of funding, this is, of course, the magnitude which is at the focus of attention of the participating countries of the Cairo conference. Ambitions were stated in 1994
for the total group of OECD/DAC countries in US dollars (in 1993 prices) and in percentages.
In dollars the goal for the year 2000 was set at US$ 5.7 billion to increase over the years to the 9 level of US$ 7.2 billion in 2015 when the Cairo program officially ends. In percentages the primary funds should be at least 4 percent of the level of official development assistance (ODA). As one can see from Table 1 
HERE FIGURE 1
But the actual disbursements of funds have varied in the past between $1.4 and $2.1 billion (see Table 1 ) and has been quite volatile in these seven years. The same can be said for the underlying categories. The unearmarked contributions follow a U-shaped pattern over time, family planning seems to follow an inverse U-pattern, HIV/AIDS spending increases with some jumps, and reproductive health and basic research are hard to describe in a simple time pattern.
HERE TABLE 1

Sharing the ICPD Burden
In Table 2 we present the average shares of the OECD/DAC countries in the total of funds per donor category. Each category of population assistance is characterized by a marked different distribution across donors. The unearmarked funds are, however, not allocated directly, as mentioned earlier.
To get an impression of the ability to donate funds the share in GDP per country in the total GDP of the group of 21 countries is also added to the table in column (7).
HERE TABLE 2
One can see clearly how the allocation differs quite distinctly across the different categories. Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and Population Action International (PAI). A striking fact in this ranking of outperformers and underperformers is that the same ranking does not correspond closely with that of ODA.
HERE FIGURE 2
In Figure 2 the primary funds share (of Table 1 ) is compared with the ODA share of these 21
countries. Countries such as Japan, France, Germany, Spain and Italy apparently have a different preference for the allocation of ODA as their ODA share is far larger than their population aid share, and the United States has a far lower share when it comes to ODA. This suggests that countries have either different interests or differ with respect to their comparative advantages in providing population aid. Figure 3 offers a more detailed picture for all OECD/DAC countries of their allocation of development assistance funds.
HERE FIGURE 3
To examine a number of examples of countries where domestic interests prevail over the interest of the developing world we can start with Japan. In the case of Japan it becomes clear by reading the ODA Charter where the ultimate objective of Japanese development assistance is stated as: "to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity." Foreign aid can be viewed as enlightened self interest and this becomes apparent by the large share of loans (55 percent) of the bilateral aid of Japan -aid is tacitly seen as an investment in less developed countries and not a gift -and a clear priority attribution of ODA to Asia: 74 percent of ODA is disbursed to the region with China, Indonesia, India and the Philippines as the largest recipients. (Eurobarometer, 2005) . The French respondents are very outspoken with respect to helping the poor in Africa, but then again this is a continent with some firm roots in the French republic.
The motive of enlightened self interest which drives funding in France and Japan is in stark contrast with the reviews which the Norwegian and Dutch government received in the past. Both are leading countries in terms of donor contributions to the ICPD Programme of Action and development assistance in general. Official development assistance totaled 0.9 and 0.8 percent, respectively, of their gross national product. These governments are firmly devoted to fighting poverty in LDCs. It is known from numerous policy documents that the Norwegian government emphasizes a rights-based approach to development in connection with the fight against poverty. In other words, it will assist partner countries to incorporate obligations to deliver human rights within their national poverty reduction strategies. percent of the citizens of these countries believe nationally provided development aid makes a difference. The Dutch also favor the use of country-owned strategies and it tries to make extensive use of private and non-governmental organizations in implementing its programs.
This policy stance is in line with the goals and intentions stated in the ICPD agenda. E.g., family planning and reproductive health care are typically about empowering women and giving households the opportunity to make well-balanced family choices.
Finally, we cannot neglect the influence of the United States in supporting population assistance and the ICPD agenda. The role of the United States has always been large in matters of population assistance (see Salas, 1979; Wolfson, 1983; Schindlmayer, 2004) 
Method and Results
To explain the behavior of donors in funding over time more thoroughly we have pooled the experiences of the 21 countries and employed the method of dynamic panel estimation. by UNESCO (2000) . 9 Finally, we have included membership of the European Union as an explanatory dummy because we expect that some countries will take account of the fact that the European Union is a separate contributor to the ICPD agenda and changes in donor funding from the EU can have some effect on funding behavior of individual EU members.
Opportunism comes in different guises and we aim to look at one source of opportunism. According to an overview of population assistance from the 1970s to the 1990s
by Schindlmayer (2001 Schindlmayer ( , 2004 , population conferences are places where money is easily raised to cash in on the attention of those gatherings. To test the idea of opportunism in 16 funding, we will use the case of the population conference held in The Hague in February 1999 as our testing ground. An opportunist government would raise its level of funding in the year 1999 when the focus of the developed world is on the developing world and decrease its funding afterwards. For this purpose we defined a dummy variable that takes on the value zero before 1999, has the value 1 in the year 1999 and for the remaining three years in our sample period the dummy value is -1. The assumption is therefore that during the year in which a population conference is held governments raise their contributions and in the subsequent three years they decrease their contributions. The end result of this strategic behavior is that by shifting resources in time they 'buy' attention (Schindlmayer, 2001 ). The developing countries will, however, be on the losing side because it simply means that donors diminish their contributions in net terms.
Explaining the Level of Disbursements
The level of primary funds and the various subcategories are explained by a set of variables, as described above. Both the level of primary funds, split up by spending categories, and GDP are measured in constant US dollars (in 1995 prices). All the explanatory variables have been summed up above. The results of the estimation exercise are presented in Table 3.   10   HERE TABLE 3 One robust observation which can be derived from this table is the tight relationship between national income development and the generation of primary funds. The total income elasticity Table 3 do not give an unambiguous verdict about the presence of political opportunism in offering population aid.
We tested a number of dummy variables capturing the manner in opportunism could apply to funding behavior by varying the length of years in which funds are decreased after increasing in the year in which the population conference was held, when attention for the cause of the ICPD agenda is highest. For the discussion we will only focus on the robust outcomes and a robust finding is that at the aggregate level of primary funds there is no trace of opportunism to be found. There is, however, some opportunism present in the funding of family planning and reproductive health. Considering the absence of an effect at the aggregate level, this type of opportunism could well be a consequence of shifting priorities decided at The Hague Forum. Of course, a firm test would have to include more population conferences to see if 18 there is truth to the claim of opportunism. The Hague Forum was organized as a kind of midterm review and with hindsight cannot be seen as a real agenda setting conference as it was in the past in Bucharest, Mexico City or Cairo.
The responsiveness of donor governments to the conditions of recipient countries is approximated by the coefficients with respect to development status of the donor and the development gap with LDCs. In the theory of collective action the reason behind the formation of multilateral or international organizations is that there is a common threat (Sandler and Hartley, 2001 ). In the case of foreign aid this could well be the threat of unsustainable population growth, widespread poverty, or an epidemic. Testing this theory to the case of foreign population assistance is difficult because it entails capturing the threat in matters of population policy and collecting indicators in a consistent manner over time and across countries. In case of war, the threat is obvious, but in case of the ICPD agenda the threat is less clear. For the past population conferences the threat was clearly overpopulation or excessive population growth. However, with the Cairo conference human rights, especially those of women, became more prominent. Human welfare is assumed to be the central concept and we approximated this by using the Human Development Index of the WHO. To distinguish in a comparable manner the effect of human welfare on donating funds we used two variables: one representing the HDI of the donor country and the other representing the gap in human development between the donor country in question and the least developed countries. If the gap widens we would expect donor countries to be more responsive and increase the level of funding.
To start with the concern with the fate of LDCs, the estimation results show that for population assistance in general the development gap is of no concern (see column 6). It is, however, clearly an issue in the case of unearmarked funds, family planning and basic The government size is perhaps an imperfect proxy as a driving force for development aid, but it is nevertheless stressed by Addison et al. (2004) that a member's ability to bear 20 financial responsibility for development aid commitments depends on the size of the public sector in that country. The relationship is straightforward: the capacity to fund development aid programs depends very much on the government's ability to tax and the more a government can tax the easier it can finance aid programs. In Table 3 And this brings us to the last variable of interest: religion. As is known from research on private donations to churches and other charity goals (e.g. Regnerus et al. 1998 , Iannaccone, 1998 , differences between religions play a large role in the level of donations.
Religion itself is a clear force in explaining the level of funds across countries. As one can see countries where the Catholicism belongs to one of the top two religions in a country exerts a clear negative force with respect to donations to multilateral organizations (as approximated by unearmarked funding in column 1) and family planning projects. If the Protestant or Lutheran religion belongs to one the dominant religions in the donor country this negative effect is counterbalanced or even overcompensated. However, we should be careful in putting too much weight on the religious factor and not confuse this element with a country 21 characteristic. It may well be the case that a binding factor in giving development aid plays a dominant role that coincides with the religious dummy variables. It is well-known that the Scandinavian countries fund a relatively high share of ODA or population assistance and these countries happen to be dominated by the Lutheran religion.
Are Burdens Shared Equally?
The previous model tried to mimic the behavior of a typical donor government in determining the level of aid. However, the question that concerns collective action is the question of sharing financial burdens. To explain burden sharing in development assistance we follow the approach of Addison et al. (2004) who examined burden sharing in the case of multilateral foreign aid and found some traces of so-called 'reverse exploitation': the small countries support multilateral agencies disproportionately. The share of funds of a donor country in the total of funds is explained its ability to pay, as approximated by the share of GDP in the group of OECD/DAC countries. To control for other factors which impinge on donor behavior we have used a number of variables that also appear in Table 3 . Table 4 presents the estimation results. Because most of the effects of the control variables are in line with those reported in Table 3 we will refrain from repeating ourselves. The parameter of central interest is, of course, the coefficient representing the effect of a change in income share to a change in the share of population assistance.
HERE TABLE 4
If each and every country carries the burden of financing a pure public good in line with its ability to pay, the burden sharing coefficient would be equal to one and if we assume that everyone has the same capabilities and preferences the effect of other variables would be 22 negligible. The 'exploitation hypothesis' would be a case where the burden sharing coefficient is larger than one, and 'reverse exploitation' would, of course, boil down to the case where the coefficient is smaller than one. The term 'exploitation' should however be carefully interpreted because there can only be exploitation in case a population assistance program is a pure global public good. In other words, if there are no individual-specific side benefits to the provision of foreign aid. In that respect, the term 'exploitation' is something of a misnomer because it does not necessarily signify exploitation of the big by the small countries. It could very well be the case that governments act in accordance with the principles of comparative advantage or economies of scale, or they derive benefits from 'giving' based on ideological preferences or religious principles. The ability to pay is the starting point for the estimation exercise, but given the fact that is difficult to really pin down the case of exploitation the focus in this section will be on shedding light on revealed burden sharing in terms of the ability to pay as well as other factors.
The estimation results (in Table 4 ) show unambiguously that family planning, reproductive health, HIV/AIDS and basic research are programs for which large countries pay disproportionately. 11 The picture is reversed for unearmarked contributions. For this type of funds the small countries pay disproportionately more than their size would predict. The latter is in line with the findings of Addison et al. (2004) . For the sharing of the burden of the ICPD agenda in general (see column 6), one can see that on an aggregate scale the burden sharing coefficient is virtually one. This finding is of some significance as it brings across that message that differences in funding are not so much the result of ability to pay, as approximated by the share of GDP within the group of OECD/DAC members, but far more the result of different (religious) preferences and different developments in income per capita and government size (see again column 6). Especially religion plays a large role in determining the burden share.
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Conclusion and Discussion
What drives the funding behavior of donor countries in light of the International Conference on Population and Development? Is it just a matter of ability to pay or is the willingness to pay of overriding importance? Although these questions may seem 'academic' to the policy advocates these questions go right to the heart of the entire enterprise of the ICPD.
Understanding why differences in funding occur between donor countries may be the key to making the Cairo agenda a successful example of global collective action or at least understand why the financial ambitions of 1994 are out of reach (cf. Potts et al, 1999) . In this study we present a first glance of the experience of population assistance developments over the years 1996-2002. Our analysis is certainly not the final verdict on motives and mechanisms driving donor funding. Given the fact that we have used data at a rather aggregated level, this type of analysis should be the starting point for digging deeper.
The patterns in donor funding as revealed by our statistical analysis are bound to trigger a déjà vu amongst policy watchers of the past (Wolfson, 1983, and Salas, 1979) . The
Cairo conference and the Programme of Action were seen as "a turning point" but when it comes down to money, it appears that old habits do not die or at least are very slow in changing. The most dominant new trend is the rise of funding for HIV/AIDS and the concomitant fall in support for family planning. However, this trend is driven by the dominance exerted by the choices made by the United States. And this is again an old theme, together with the fact that promises have not been met and the fact that small countries are firmer supporters of multilateral organizations than larger countries that prefer bilateral aid channels. However, two additional factors deserve special mention because they exert such a strong influence on donor funding: the influence of religion in donor countries and the domestic interests vis-a-vis those of the recipient. To start with the latter, donor countries are willing to contribute to the ICPD agenda, but those contributions depend on the national 24 ability to pay and national interests and egalitarian or religious preferences and to a far lesser extent the situation which less developed countries face. The lack of attention to conditions of the recipient is not a unique characteristic of population assistance programs, it is central to most issues of development assistance and that of global health problems in particular. This simple insight helps to explain why funds fall short of the high ambitions of ICPD. In 1994 the unmet needs of developing countries were taken as a point of departure, whereas actual funding decisions reveal that donor countries take their own ability to pay as a point of departure. In short, despite the 'new' rhetoric espoused at Cairo, donor behavior as revealed by their funding decisions does not seem to have changed substantially over time (cf. the overview provided by Schindlmayr, 2004) .
The second element often mentioned in discussing population assistance issues is the role of religion. The regression results show that it is a decisive factor in explaining crosscountry differences. Catholic countries are far more averse to family planning programs than, e.g., protestant countries. This should not surprise insiders because womens' reproductive and sexual rights, the abortion issue and gender equality are all issues that sometimes clash with religious principles. The 1994 Cairo Conference was characterized by heated debates colored by the religious positions of the various advocates (anti-abortionists, anti-reproductive rights lobbies, etc.) In that respect the religious factor also helps to understand why family planning lost ground to the HIV/AIDS movement in getting acknowledged as one of the eight Millennium Development Goals. As one insider explains: the UN Secretariat "did not want to reopen 'the mess' of Cairo" (Crossette, 2005: 75) .
It is hard to derive firm policy lessons from these findings because some findings leave room for more than one interpretation. This is especially the case with the 'division of perhaps the main conclusion from statistics on the size and allocation of population assistance is that it very much reflects the fact that there apparently is no silver bullet solution to organizing and financing aid. As Kaul and Le Goulven (2003: 355) P o r t u g a l A u s t r i a N e w Z e a l a n d I r e l a n d
L u x e m b o u r g S p a i n I t a l y B e l g i u m S w i t z e r l a n d F r a n c e F i n l a n d A u s t r a l i a C a n a d a D e n m a r k N o r w a y S w e d e n G e r m a n y J a p a n U K N e t h e r l a n d s (a) * Significance at 5% level, ** significance at 1% level. Absolute t-statistics are in brackets below the coefficients. In using Generalized Least Squares panel specific AR(1) processes were added to correct for autocorrelation in the time series, and estimates are also corrected for heteroskedasticity. To gauge the goodness of fit we present two loglikelihood values: L A for the full model and L 0 for the model without any explanatory variables or correction for serial correlation or heteroskedasticity.
(b) The development gap is defined as: HDI donor country i -HDI of LDC. (a) * Significance at 5% level, ** significance at 1% level. Absolute t-statistics are in brackets below the coefficients. In using Generalized Least Squares panel specific AR(1) processes were added to correct for autocorrelation, and estimates are also corrected for heteroskedasticity. To gauge the goodness of fit we present two loglikelihood values: L A for the full model and L 0 for the model without any explanatory variables or correction for serial correlation or heteroskedasticity.
